This paper presents an experiment that allows the inference over data published in social networks, resulting in a potentially severe privacy leak, more specifically the inference of geo-location resulting in the potential of cybercasing attacks. We present an algorithm that allows the inference of the geo-location of YouTube and Flickr videos based on the tag descriptions. Using the locations, we find people where we can infer both the home address as well as the fact that they are currently on vacation, which makes them potential targets for burglary. By doing so we repeat an experiment from the literature that was originally meant to show the potential dangers of geo-tagging but replacing the geo-tags with Semantic Computing methods. We conclude that the only way to tackle potential threats like this is for researchers to develop an enhanced notion of privacy for Semantic Computing.
Introduction
Progress in Semantic Computing creates technology to automatically infer meaning from various types of data with the goal to perform operations that do "what the user means". While this is, at large, a highly desirable goal, we have to keep in mind that this allows adversary users to infer meaning on personal data, even if that meaning was never intended to be inferred. This is especially a problem when Semantic Computing technology is mixed with social computing.
Recently, privacy issues based on the information published by individuals on social networking sites have raised increased attention both in the research community as well as in the popular press. One particular issue, namely the hidden inclusion of geographical information has been shown to be a major security risk [6] as it enables so-called cybercasing, i.e. it allows potential attackers to track an individual and gain enough information about the person to pursue criminal offenses, such as stalking and burglary. In this article, we will use the example of cybercasing based on geo-tags to show that the incorporation of geo-information is not the actual problem. The real problem is the unawareness of people posting the information that with every bit posted (past videos, tags, date), several other bits (home location, current location) can be inferred using Semantic Computing technologies and related methods. Correlation of seemingly innocuous information can create inference chains that tell much more about individuals than they are aware of revealing. Most importantly, it provides evidence that not only are users unaware of the issue, many experts are unaware as well. Most importantly though, privacy preserving mechanisms do not take this kind of "inference attack" into account, leaving Internet users vulnerable to the abuse of Semantic Computing technologies.
This article first presents a system that uses a Semantic Computing technology to infer the geo-location of videos from textual metadata. Then, using the system, the YouTube cybercasing experiment presented in [6] is repeated completely without the use of geo-tags by using semantic technologies to infer location from textual metadata. We conclude that the Semantic Computing community needs to start thinking more about privacy issues when creating increasingly powerful search and retrieval methods.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the topic of privacy concerns based on geo-location. Section 3 then introduces the task of multimodal location estimation, which allows to infer the location of a given video based on metadata tags and visual features. Section 4 then explains the orginal cybercasing experiment followed by the modification based on semantic methods. Section 5 concludes the article.
Related Work
Location-based services are rapidly gaining traction. An extensive and rapidly growing set of online services is collecting, providing, and analyzing geo-information. Besides major players like Google and Yahoo!, there are many smaller start-ups in the space as well. Foursquare encourages its users to constantly "check-in" their current position, which they then propagate on to friends, Yowza!! provides an iPhone application that automatically locates discount coupons for stores in the user's current geographical area, and SimpleGeo aims at being a one-stop aggregator for location data, making it particularly easy for others to find and combine information from different sources. In a parallel development, a growing number of sites now provide public APIs for structured access to their content, and many of these already come with geo-location functionality. Flickr, YouTube, and Twitter allow queries for results originating at a certain location. The main driving force behind these services is the enabling of a very personalized and intuitive experience -a very Semantic Computing argument. Apple for example introduced geo-tagging to iPhones so that the iPhoto application could organize photos by location and time. In other words, location information can be used to shortcut otherwise difficult multimedia retrieval techniques.
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The privacy implications of recording locations have received attention particularly in the blogosphere and lately also in the news. However, these discussions are mostly anecdotal and they rarely consider how the ease of searching and correlating information elevates the risk. From a more general perspective, the EFF published a thoughtful white paper on Locational Privacy [3] , discussing implications of secretly recording peoples' activity in public spaces.
Pleaserobme.com [14] was probably the first effort that demonstrated the malicious potential of systematic location-based search: the authors leveraged Foursquare's "check-ins" to identify users who are currently not at their homes. However, in this case locations were deliberately provided by the potential victims, rather than being implicitly attached to files they upload. Also, geo-tagging is a hazard to a much wider audience, as even people who consciously opt-out of reporting any information might still see their location become public through a third party publishing photos or videos, e.g., from a private party. Besmer and Lipford [1] examine a related risk in the context of social networks that allow users to add identifying tags to photos published on their profile pages. The authors conduct a user study that reveals concerns about being involuntarily tagged on photos outside of a user's own control. They also present a tool for negotiating photo sharing permissions within the social network.
To mitigate the privacy implications, researchers have started to apply privacypreserving approaches from the cryptographic community to geo-information. Zhong et al. [16] present protocols for securely learning a friend's position if and only if that person is actually nearby, and without any service provider having to be aware of the users' locations. Olumofin et al. [12] discuss a technique that allows a user to retrieve point-of-interest information from a database server without having to disclose the exact location. Poolsappasit et al. [13] present a system for location-based services that allows specification and enforcement of specific privacy preferences. From a different perspective, Krumm [8] offers a survey of ways that computation can be used to both protect and compromise geometrical location data.
Friedland and Sommer [6] analyzed the privacy implications of geotagging, i.e. high-accuracy location information attached as meta-data to audio, image, and video files. Specifically, examining the risk that such geotags pose for what they termed "cybercasing": using online data and services to mount real-world attacks. The work was based on the observation that an extensive and rapidly growing set of online services is already collecting, analyzing, and integrating geoinformation. They presented three scenarios demonstrating the ease of correlating geotagged data with publicly available information compromising a victim's privacy. First, they examined tracking a specific person, in this case TV show host Adam Savage. Images posted to his twitter feed allowed us to pinpoint the location of his home and studio. Then they used Craigslist to find For Sale classifieds containing geotagged images but no address in the textual description. A fair amount of the geotagged postings offered high-valued goods, such as diamonds apparently photographed at home; making them potential targets for burglars. Finally, they demonstrated how one can semi-automatically identify the home addresses of people who normally live in a certain area but are currently on vacation using video postings on YouTube. This article shows, however, that geo-tagging is not the issue as the same information can already be inferred using Semantic technologies with high enough accuracy.
Multimodal Location Estimation
Currently, GPS is not available indoors or where there is no line of sight with the satellites. So the services mentioned in the previous section only work very limitedly. For this reason, research has recently started on automatic localization methods to enable geo-location where it is not regularly available. The task is sometimes called "multimodal location estimation" or "placing". Just as a human analyst uses multiple sources of information and context to determine geo-location, it is obvious that for location estimation, processing clues from multiple modalities and combining them with diverse knowledge sources from the web (context) can lead to better results than utilizing only one stream of sensor input.
This task has recently caught the attention of researchers in the multimedia branch of Semantic Computing, as well as in the signal processing, and machine learning communities because of the large amount of available geo-tagged media on the Internet that can be used as training data, allowing algorithms to work on data volumes rarely seen before. Also, in the recent past, semantic services for mapping names to geographical locations have become available. In addition, the task is hard enough to require the collaboration of many different experts and communities, which is a challenge on its own.
The base for the privacy experiment described in this article, is an approach for determining the geo-coordinates of the place where Flickr videos were recorded based on textual metadata and visual cues. The system was tested on the MediaEval 2010 Placing Task evaluation data and then used on YouTube videos. In the following we describe the system first, before we describe the privacy experiment.
Definition and motivation
As initially defined in [5] , multimodal location estimation denotes the utilization of one or more cues potentially derivable from different media, e.g. audio, video, and textual metadata, to estimate the geo-coordinates of content recorded in digital media. Note that the location of the shown content might not be identical to the location where the content was created; in fact, in most cases there is a bias because the camera records GPS coordinates of the location of the camera, not of the objects captured. The difference can be up to 5 km. For practical purposes, research usually focuses on finding one unique location per file. As discussed in Sec. 2, sites like Flick allow queries for results originating at a certain location. Likewise, retro-fitting archives with location information is attractive to many businesses and opens up as-yet unimaginable usage scenarios. Also, as discussed above, except for specialized solutions, GPS is not available indoors or where there is no line of sight with satellites. So multimodal location estimation helps provide geo-location where it is not regularly available. Vacation videos and photos can be grouped even if GPS data is not attached. Movie producers have long sought methods for finding scenes at specific locations or showing specific events in order to be able to reuse them. After an incident, law enforcement agencies spend many person-months finding images and videos that show a specific address (including tourist recordings) in order to identify a suspect or other evidence. Also, intercepted audio, terrorist videos, and evidence of kidnappings is often most useful to law enforcement when the location can be inferred from the recording. At present, however, human expert analysts have to spend many hours looking for clues of the location of a target video. Even when there is an obvious clue that could easily be identified by a computer, humans have to pay attention and watch the video carefully until the point when the hint is revealed. If the human expert's attention wavers during the particular set of frames where the audio or image clue appears, the location might never be determined. There are many clues that are hard to perceive for a human being, such as a masked sound, a small object, or slight variations in lighting conditions that are the result of a unique landscape not captured by the camera. Therefore, even partially successful semi-automatic location detection would reduce the work of human analysts to detect the location of videos, especially in cases that are obvious. Human experts could concentrate on the more difficult cases. The computer might provide confidence output and suggestions to be judged by the analyst, saving workload even for videos that are not completely classifiable by the computer.
MediaEval
The MediaEval 2010 Placing Task, organized by [11] , is to automatically guess the location of the video, i.e. assign geo-coordinates (latitude and longitude) to videos using one or more of: video metadata (tags, titles), visual content, audio content, social information. Any use of open resources, such as gazetteers, or geo-tagged articles in Wikipedia is encouraged. The goal of the task is to come as close to possible to the geo-coordinates of the videos as provided by users or their GPS devices.
The data set consists of Creative Common-licensed videos that were manually crawled from Flickr. The videos are in MPEG-4 format and include the Flickr metadata in XML format. The meta-data for each video includes user-contributed title, tags, description, comments and also information about the user who uploaded the video. Additionally, the metadata records also include information about the user's contacts, favorites, and all videos uploaded in the past. The data set was divided into training data (5091 videos) and test data (5125 videos).
According to [9] , videos were selected both to provide a broad coverage of users, and also because they were geo-tagged with a high accuracy at the "street level". An accuracy field indicates the zoom level the uploader used when placing the photo or video on the map. There are 16 zoom levels, and these correspond to 16 accuracy levels (e.g. "region level", "city level", "street level"). The sets of users from the test and the training collections were disjoint in order to not introduce a user-specific bias.
In order to allow visual matching as performed in [7] , the dataset also contained metadata and features extracted from 3,185,258 Flickr images. However, not all the photos had textual metadata and the photos were only guaranteed to have geo-tagging on region-level granularity. The MediaEval 2010 training data was supplemented with visual features extracted for both photos and frames of the videos. For videos, every fourth second of a video was extracted and saved as a JPEG-image. Nine visual features were extracted using the open source LIRE library [10] 
Characteristics of the data
Flickr requires that an uploaded video must be created by its uploader (if a user violates this policy, Flickr sends a warning and removes the video). Manual inspection of the data set leads us initially to conclude that most of visual/audio contents lack reasonable evidence to estimate the location without textual metadata. For example, many videos were recorded indoors or in a private space such as a backyard of a house, which make the Placing Task nearly impossible if we examine only the visual and audio contents. This indicates that the videos are not pre-filtered or pre-selected in any way to make the data set more relevant to the task, and are therefore likely representative of videos selected at random.
In order to get an impression of the dataset, we manually watched 84 randomly chosen videos from the training set. Only 2.4% of them were recorded in a controlled environment such as inside a studio at a radio station. The other 97.6% were homevideo style with ambient noises and unstable camera settings. About 5% of the videos were edited to contain changed scenes or fast or slow replay. The relatively short lengths of each video should be noted as the maximum length of Flickr videos is limited to 90 seconds. Moreover, about 70% of videos in our data set have less than 50 seconds playtime. Figure 2 shows several sample frames from the MediaEval 2010 test set.
However, metadata provided by the user often provides direct and sensible clues for the task. 98.8% of videos in the training set were annotated by their uploaders with at least a title, tags, or description, often including location information. For a human, it is a fairly straightforward task to determine from the metadata which keyword or keywords combination indicates the smallest and most accurate geographical entity. However, for a machine, extracting a list of toponym candidate keywords and further choosing a correct single keyword or combination of keywords is a challenging task. Misspelled or compound words concatenated without spaces are commonly found in user-annotated metadata and these add more difficulty to the task. For example, "my trip to fishermanswharf san francisco" should resolve to the "Fisherman's Wharf" in "San Francisco". Furthermore, partly because of social, political, and economical reasons, in current online video databases (e.g. Flickr and YouTube), videos are not equally distributed over the earth. Therefore downloading a random sample, as performed for MediaEval 2010, leads to a large bias towards certain locations. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the MediaEval training set. While it will always be difficult to find videos from certain countries or remote places, a training set that is more equally distributed is desirable for improving global retrieval precision and recall.
Algorithm
Our approach to location estimation is a semantic-driven method based on the open service Geonames.org. GeoNames covers all countries and contains 8 million entries of place names and corresponding geo-coordinates. It provides a web-based search engine and an API which returns a list of matching entries ordered by their relevance to the query. The input for our algorithm is a list of tags corresponding to a test video. A single tag may cause ambiguity by representing multiple entities (e.g. "Paris Texas" vs. "Paris France"). Thus it is crucial to find a combination of keywords that minimizes ambiguity if possible. A computationally inefficient but effective way to do this, is to query the Geonames database exhaustively for every possible combination of keywords. To reduce the run time of the search, we filtered the keywords using a Bloom Filter [2] built over the downloaded database of Geonames. In this method, all compound keywords of every length were tested (e.g. "sanfrancisco" and "San Francisco" were both in the Bloom Filter). If the Bloom Filter returned positive, they were added to a candidate list. The Bloom Filter may sometimes return false positives, but these were assumed to be removed by the Geonames search engine. Tags were concatenated into a string in their original
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order. The order is preserved to handle the context within compound words such as "San Francisco" or "Washington DC".
One problem with using a gazetteer is that it has no background model of words that are likely to appear in regular language, i.e. it does give positive results on words such as "video" and "vacation" because there is a city of Video in Brazil and a Vacation Island in San Diego. Therefore we filtered out common nouns by using Augmented-WordNet [15] . Augmented-WordNet is an extended version of WordNet [4] , that among other things includes annotation for geographical entities. WordNet is a freely available online lexical database of English which contains a network of semantic relationships between words. Note that Flickr videos and photos are annotated in any language so this approach only helped for the English subset.
After filtering, we passed the query to the Geonames search engine and retrieved the list of possible matches. We added the entity with the highest relevance (the first entity in the response list) to the list of candidate entities. Once we obtained the list of candidate entities, we resolved the containment problem (e.g. "Fisherman's Wharf, San Francisco, CA"): Geonames entities provide country code, code of administrative subdivision (typically the city), and feature class parameters. We gave higher priority to entities representing a smaller region (as of Geonames) by removing larger entities containing the smaller entities.
For choosing the best match among the list of candidates, we plot all candidate entities on a map and pick the one that has the largest count of neighbors with lowest spatial variance. If there is a tie, the coordinate that is closest to the user's home location is picked (as described in the videos' metadata). If there is no matching entity for all keywords in the metadata of a given video, we assume the most likely geo-coordinate based on the prior distribution of the MediaEval training set (see Fig. 1 ), which is the point with latitude and longitude (40.71257011, -74.10224). A place close to New York City.
Results
The evaluation of our results is performed by applying the same rules and using the same metric as in the MediaEval 2010 evaluation. In MediaEval 2010, participants were to built systems to automatically guess the location of the video, i.e. assign geocoordinates (latitude and longitude) to videos using one or more of: video metadata (tags, titles), visual content, audio content, social information. Even though training data was provided (see Sec. 3.3), any "use of open resources, such as gazetteers, or geo-tagged articles in Wikipedia was encouraged" [11] . It was not allowed, however, to match the videos back to the Flickr database in order to retrieve the original metadata record as this would have rendered the task trivial. The goal of the task was to come as close as possible to the geo-coordinates of the videos as provided by users or their GPS devices. The systems were evaluated by calculating the geographical distance from the actual geo-location of the video (assigned by a Flickr user, creator of the video) to the predicted geo-location (assigned by the system).
While it was important to minimize the distances over all test videos, runs were compared by finding how many videos were placed within a threshold distance of 1 km, 5 km, 10 km, 50 km and 100 km. For analyzing the algorithm in greater detail, here we also show distances of below 100 m and below 10 m. The lowest distance category is about the accuracy of a typical GPS localization system in a camera or smartphone. Figure 4 shows the results on the MediaEval 2010 dataset.
Location and Privacy
In [6] the privacy implications of geo information where analyzed, examining the risk that geo-tags pose for what was termed "cybercasing": using online data and services to mount real-world attacks. The following section describes the original experiment, followed by a modification of the experiment that uses no geo-tagging but the algorithm described in Sec. 3.4 to determine the geo-location.
Original experiment
In the original experiment from [6] , the authors examined whether one can semiautomatically identify the home addresses of people who normally live in a certain area but are currently on vacation. Such knowledge offers opportunities for burglars to break into their unoccupied homes. They wrote a script using the YouTube API that, given a home location, a radius, and a keyword, finds a set of matching videos. For all the videos found, the script then gathers the associated YouTube user names and downloads all videos that are a certain vacation distance away and have been uploaded the same week. Figure 5 shows a schematic of the algorithm. They set the home location to be in Berkeley, CA, downtown and the radius to 60 miles. As the keyword to search for we picked "kids" since many people publish home videos of their children. The vacation distance was 1000 miles. The script reported 1000 hits (the maximum number) for the initial set of videos matching "kids". These then expanded to about 50,000 total videos in the second step, identifying all other videos from the corresponding users. 106 of these turned out to have been taken more than 1000 miles away and uploaded the same week. Sifting quickly through the titles of these videos, they found about a dozen that looked promising for successful cybercasing. For example, a video uploaded by a user who was currently traveling in the Caribbean, as could clearly be seen by content, geotagging, and the date displayed in the video (one day before their search). The title of the video was similar to "first day on the beach". Also, comments posted along with the video on YouTube indicated that the user had posted multiple vacation videos and is usually timely in doing so. When he is not on vacation, he seemed to live with his kids near Albany, CA (close to Berkeley) as several videos were posted from his home, with the kids playing. Figure 5 shows an example.
Semantic-computing-based cybercasing
As a first experiment we wanted to measure the performance of the algorithm described in Sec. 3.4 trained on the Flickr data described in Sec. 3.3 when applied to YouTube videos. We performed the experiment by downloading 4492 random geotagged YouTube videos and applying the location estimation algorithm as described. Figure 6 shows the result. Unsurprisingly, due to the training data mismatch, the algorithm performs a little worse. For instance, the number of videos estimated with worse than 1000 km accuracy is 29.3% for Flickr and 65.9% when applied to YouTube. However, a very high accuracy is not actually needed for the cybercasing experiment since all that needs to be done is find enough true positives.
In order to show that geo-tags are actually not needed to repeat the scenario, we repeated the original experiment using only keyword search and using the location estimation algorithm described in Sec. 3.4. In order to do so, we searched for videos that contained keywords of cities known to be in about 100 km radius around Berkeley, including Berkeley, e.g. Oakland, San Francisco, Albany, etc. In addition, we also specified the keyword "kids" and "livingroom". The number of videos matched was then filtered to contain only thoses where YouTube profiles contained real names and other personal information. The result were 107 videos of which most were indoors showing living rooms and yards. In order to determine the location for these videos, we matched the real names specified in YouTube against a phonebook database search.
a From these 107 initial videos we then tried to get the videos that belonged to the same users and were uploaded within the last week to YouTube. Of these 2000 videos, we filtered potential hits by applying the multimodal location estimation algorithm as described in Sec. 3.4. 112 videos were potentially more than 1000 km away. We then screened these 112 videos manually and found more than a dozen hits, just like in the original cybercasing experiment described in Sec. 4.1. Table 1 shows a summary comparison of the two results.
While this experiment still needed a final manual screening of the videos, we want to stress that the techniques used could be easily refined, e.g. by creating a Which we choose not to disclose here. language model filters for the metadata of home and vacation videos. So a fully automatic approach does not seem impossible.
Semantic Computing and Privacy
The described experiment makes a case for the emerging privacy issue caused by inference technologies, such as provided by Semantic Computing methods, allowing potential attackers to easily case out joints in cyberspace (identical to what was described and attributed to geo-tags [6] ). While this article focusses on geoinformation, it is clear that the phenomenon is a general one: As explained in Sec. 2, geo-tags were introduced as a short-cut for inaccurate multimedia retrieval technologies. Therefore, they provide an excellent example of what would happen if semantic retrieval of multimedia data actually worked. We show, however, that even though semantic methods are not perfectly accurate yet, they are able to infer enough information already to repeat the original Youtube cybercasing experiment without geo-tags. Several factors aggravate the problem. First, many people are either unaware of the fact that inference technologies exist, especially with such accuracy and what consequences publishing the information may have. Second, even experts often fail to appreciate the easy search capabilities of todays online APIs and the resulting inference possibilities. Third, the fact that current Semantic Computing methods are not perfectly accurate must not mislead us into ignoring the problem because (i) with the commercial pressure and researchers working hard, the accuracy will improve; and (ii) our experiments demonstrate that even a seemingly small fraction of true positive results can already translate into several hundred relevant cases within only a small geographical area. Furthermore it is important to understand that inference is a global phenomenon. The Internet stores information forever and pieces can be collected from distributed websites. Also, the Internet contains information about persons who never even visited a social networking site, e.g. small children in a YouTube video. Ignorance or not using the Internet is therefore not a safeguard as other people can publish information about oneself.
We therefore feel there is a clear need for education, as well as for research on designing systems to be semantic-aware while at the same time offering maximum 92 G. Friedland & J. Choi protection against privacy infringement through inference. We think such protection can only be developed by the same community that understands the inference technologies. We therefore advocate a paradigm shift in the community to create privacy-aware Semantic Computing technologies. Just as Semantic Computing methods help infer information, such inference should be blocked based on the users need for privacy. Semantic Computing methods should be used to define privacy and security policies and make them usable. This problem is going to be a challenge for the next generation of researchers. However, if the community does not start to act now, more and more people might become victims of inference attacks and the reaction to that could harm the progress of the Semantic Computing field.
